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January 1969] Recent Developments 
REAPPORTIONMENT-LEGISLATIVE BODIES-
Significant Deviation from Standard of Substantial 
Population Equality of State Legislative Districts 
Is Permissible To Provide Representatives for 
Two Island Counties-Vigneault v. 
Secretary of the Commonwealth* 
587 
In 1967 the Massachusetts legislature adopted a legislative reap-
portionment plan for the state's lower house.1 The 240 seats of 
the lower house-the Massachusetts House of Representatives--
were allocated along county lines as set forth in table 1.2 A resi-
dent of one of the Massachusetts mainland counties challenged 
the state reapportionment plan as inconsistent with the one man-one 
vote principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in 
Reynolds v. Sims.3 The mainland resident argued that the allocation 
of one representative to each of the two island counties off the 
Massachusetts coast-Nantucket, with a population of 3,714, and 
• 237 N.E.2d 286 (Mass. 1968) [hereinafter principal case). 
1. Ch. 877, § 11, [1967) Mass. Acts, amending MAss. GEN. LA.ws .ANN. ch. 57 (19112). 
2. Principal case, app. A at 290. See page 588 infra. 
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County of Dukes, with a population of 5,948-was a violation of the 
equal protection clause4 because it denied him an equal vote com-
pared with island residents and equal representation in the state's 
lower house. The plan gave each island one representative even 
though the average population per representative statewide was 
22,064, almost six times the population of Nantucket and over three 
and one-half times that of the County of Dukes. The Supreme 
Judicial Court of Massachusetts found that the island counties had a 
long history of individual representation in the state legislature, that 
the reapportionment plan was supported by a rational state policy, 
that it followed the boundaries of existing political subdivisions 
(counties), and that under the plan a majority of voters in counties 
comprising 49.76 per cent of the population of the state could elect 
enough representatives to control the lower house-only .66 per cent 
less, according to the court, than the percentage of the population 
required to control it if the apportionment had been mathematically 
perfect. Thus, the court approved the plan; held, divergence from a 
strict population standard in the apportionment of the state legisla-
ture is permissible in order to provide "genuine representation" 
for island counties. 5 
Since Baker v. Carr, 6 when the Supreme Court overruled a long 
line of earlier decisions7 and concluded that the relationship of the 
4. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § I. 
5. Principal case at 289. 
6. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
7. The earlier cases held that the Court would not adjudicate political questions 
involving legislative reapportionment and dilution of individual voting power by state 
law; see, e.g., Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 
(1947); Remmy v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952). 
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equal protection clause to a state's power to create geographical dis-
tricts for legislative representation was a justiciable issue,8 state 
apportionment plans have come under increasing judicial scrutiny. In 
Gray v. Sanders,9 the Court held invalid a Georgia primary election 
plan which favored voters from rural areas. Although Gray dealt 
with the dilution of individual voting rights rather than legislative 
reapportionment, it is important as the first enunciation of the now-
famous "one man-one vote" test. Specifically, the Court stated that 
"[t]he conception of political equality from the Declaration of 
Independence, to Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, to the Fifteenth, 
Seventeenth, and Nineteenth Amendments can mean only one thing 
-one person, one vote."10 
In a companion case, Wesberry v. Sanders,11 the Court ruled that 
the phrase "by the People" in article 1 of the Constitution12 required 
the federal congressional districts within a state to be as nearly equal 
in population "as is practicable." Finally, in 1964 in Reynolds v. 
Sims,13 the Supreme Court held that the equal protection clause re-
quired substantially equal legislative representation for all citizens 
in a state regardless of where they reside. Therefore, the Court held 
that the seats in both houses of a bicameral state legislature should 
be apportioned according to the "one man-one vote" rule. In Rey-
nolds, the Alabama apportionment plan then in effect allowed a 
majority of twenty-five per cent of the state's voters to elect a ma-
jority of the representatives in both houses of the legislature.14 Pro-
ceeding from "the fundamental principle of representative govern-
ment"-"equal representation for equal numbers of people"15-the 
Court established a presumption of unconstitutionality for any 
legislative apportionment that deviates from the standard of equal 
population. 
The majority in Reynolds also stated that mathematical exactness 
8. For a general discussion of the effect of the Court's reapportionment decisions, 
see McKay, Reapportionment: Success Story of the Warren Court, 67 MICH. L. REv. 
223 (1968). See also Scholle v. Hare, 369 U.S. 429 (1962) and WMCA, Inc. v. Simon, 370 
U.S. 190 (1962), both of which remanded cases challenging legislative apportionment 
to lower courts for adjudication consistent with Baker v. Carr. 
9. 372 U.S. 368 (1963). 
10. 372 U.S. at 381. 
11. 376 U.S. 1 (1964). 
12. Article I, section 2 of the Constitution states: "The House of Representatives 
shall be composed of Members chosen every second year by the People of the several 
States •••• " 
13. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). This is one of six apportionment cases decided the same 
day. The others, which explain further the holdings in Reynolds v. Sims, are Lucas 
v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713 (1964); Roman v. Sincock, 
377 U.S. 695 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964); Maryland Comm. for Fair 
Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964); and WMCA, Inc. v. Lomenzo, 377 U.S. 
633 (1964). 
14. 377 U.S. at 545. 
15. 377 U.S. at 560-61. 
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was of course not always possible;16 it left open a possible escape from 
the rigors of the "one man-one vote" rule when it noted that some 
deviation from the equal-population principle was constitutionally 
permissible "so long as the divergencies ... are based on legitimate 
considerations incident to the effectuation of a rational state 
policy."17 Such deviations were to be permitted, however, only "as 
long as the basic standard of equality of population among districts 
is maintained."18 As an example of permissible deviation from strict 
mathematical apportionment by population, the Court mentioned 
that a state might wish to establish voting districts to coincide with 
existing political subdivisions, such as counties, in order to restrict 
partisan gerrymandering or to insure some voice to political sub-
divisions as such. Although the Court stressed the essential role of 
local governmental units-both as frequent objects of state legisla-
tion19 and as instruments in the effective operation of state govern-
ment-as reason for this exception, it cautioned that a scheme giving 
at least one seat to each county, if carried too far, could subvert the 
"one man-one vote" principle.20 After Reynolds, it was clear that 
any permissible deviation from the standard of equal population 
would have to be both "minor" and "based on legitimate considera-
tions incident to the effectuation of a rational state policy."21 
With regard to the first requirement, the Supreme Court has 
never given a definitive statement of what it considers a "minor" 
deviation from the equal-population principle. There are, however, 
at least three different methods of measuring deviation.22 The most 
familiar method is to determine what is often referred to as the 
population variance ratio. This ratio is designed to show the maxi-
mum variation throughout the state in population represented per 
legislative seat.23 In Massachusetts, for example, Hampshire County's 
100,065 residents were allotted four seats in the lower house, or one 
representative for every 25,018 people; it was the most under-
16. 377 U.S. at 559-61. 
17. 377 U.S. at 579. 
18. 377 U.S. at 580. 
19. The Court might also have noted that local governmental units play a par-
ticularly significant role in many important federal legislative programs such as urban 
renewal. 
20. 377 U.S. at 580-81. See also McKay, Political Thickets and Crazy Quilts: Re-
apportionment and Equal Protection, 61 MICH. L. REv. 645, 698-99 (1963). 
21. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). A more thorough discussion of Swann 
follows in the text accompanying note 32 infra. 
22. For a more extended analysis of these methods, see King, The Reynolds Stan-
dard and Local Reapportionment, 15 BUFFALO L. REv. 120, 131-35 (1965). 
23. This was the method used in Kapral v. Jepson, 271 F. Supp. 74 (D. Conn. 1967), 
in which a 2-to-l variance was held to dilute voting rights in contravention of the 
fourteenth amendment. 
In Sincock v. Gately, 262 F. Supp. 739 (D. Del. 1967), a ratio of 1.289 to 1 in the 
Delaware general assembly and 1.33 to 1 in the Delaware state senate did not comply 
with the equal protection clause. 
January 1969] Recent Developments 591 
represented county in the lower house. But Nantucket County, pop-
ulation 3,714, was allotted one seat; it was the most over-represented 
county in the Massachusetts house. The resulting ratio-25,018 to 
3,714, or 6.7 to I-is the population variance ratio between the 
state's two extreme districts. 
The second means of assessing apportionment is the so-called 
deviations-from-the-norm method. Here, the greatest deviation from 
the average population per representative-or norm-is reflected and 
expressed as a percentage of deviation. The norm is determined by 
dividing the total number of seats in the particular legislative body 
into the total population of the state. Thus, in Massachusetts, the 
norm would be 22,064 residents per representative.24 A particular 
district's variation in population per representative from the norm 
is then determined and divided by the norm to yield the percentage 
of deviation. In Massachusetts, the greatest deviation from the norm 
is, of course, Nantucket County. Its population of 3,714 varies from 
the norm by 18,350 persons, and the percentage of deviation for this 
county is thus 83 per cent under the 1967 reapportionment plan.26 
The third identifiable method seeks to ascertain the lowest possi-
ble percentage of the state population needed to elect a majority of 
the members of a state legislative body. This figure is determined by 
adding the population of the most overrepresented districts until 
the number of representatives from these districts is sufficient to 
control the legislative branch under consideration. The population 
of these districts is then expressed as a percentage of the total popu-
lation of the state.26 The Massachusetts court used a variant of this 
approach in the principal case;27 as noted above, it found that this 
figure was 49.76 per cent. It then asserted that this was only .66 per 
cent less than the percentage dictated by a purely mathematical ap-
portionment and deemed the variation minor.28 
The principal case is the only recent decision to rely exclusively 
24. Principal case at 289 n.5. 
25. This was the method applied by a federal court in holding that legislative dis-
tricts could vary ten per cent from the statewide ratio of population and still meet the 
requirements of Reynolds in Butterworth v. Dempsey, 229 F. Supp. 754 (D. Conn. 
1964), afj'd sub nom. Pinney v. Butterworth, 378 U.S. 564 (1964). 
26. See Note, Reapportionment, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1228, 1250 (1966). 
27. See principal case at 289 n.5, where the court calculated this figure by starting 
from the proposition that 121 representatives could control the lower house. It then 
multiplied by 121 the ideal number of citizens per representative (the norm), 22,064. 
Thus, the court concluded that with mathematically perfect districts a majority of 
2,669,744 people-50.42 per cent of the state's total population-could elect 121 repre-
sentatives. The court further assumed that there were 119 mathematically perfect dis-
tricts plus the two island counties; by multiplying 119 by the norm of 22,064 and then 
adding 3,714 (Nantucket's population) and 5,948 (Dukes' population), the court con-
cluded that a majority of 2,635,278 people--49.76 per cent of the state's population-
could elect 121 representatives. Of course, subtracting the two percentages yields .66 
per cent, the figure which the court relied on to show that deviations were "minor." 
28. Principal case at 289. 
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upon this third method.29 The obvious difficulty of relying on only 
one measure of deviation-particularly this one-is illustrated by 
the court's opinion. It suggests that the Massachusetts plan actually 
affords substantially equal representation without discussing the 
sizable deviations which the first two methods of measurement re-
veal. 30 Thus, with respect to the requirement that any deviations 
from substantially equal representation must be "minor," it seems 
clear that the Massachusetts court's test-at least as presented in the 
opinion-must be rejected as misleading. Moreover, according to 
precedent, a variance ratio of 6. 7 to I and a deviation from the norm 
of eighty-three per cent cannot be considered minor. Without 
specifically defining what is "minor" and adhering to the statement 
in Reynolds that "[w]hat is marginally permissible in one State may 
be unsatisfactory in another .. .''31 the Supreme Court has recently 
considered three different reapportionment plans which supposedly 
presented only minor deviations from the equal-population princi-
ple. 
In Swann v. Adams,32 the Court struck down a reapportionment 
plan for the Florida state legislature at least in part because the 
respective variance ratios for the state senate and house were 1.30 to 
I and 1.41 to I, and the respective percentages of deviation from the 
norms were 15.09 and 18.28 per cent.33 In Duddleston v. Grills,34 the 
Court relied on Swann and vacated district court approval of the 
Indiana congressional apportionment plan which yielded a 1.2-to-l 
variance ratio and a 12.8 per cent deviation from the norm.35 Simi-
larly, in Kilgarin v. Hill,36 the Court relied on Swann to state, in 
dicta, that the variance ratio of 1.31 to I and a 14.84 per cent devia-
tion in the Texas House of Representatives probably were not minor 
variations that would permit retention of established political sub-
29. In Reynolds the Court suggested that this third method should be used in 
stating that under the contested apportionment "only 25.1 % of the State's total popula• 
tion resided in districts represented by a majority of the members of the [state] Senate, 
and only 25.7% lived in counties which could elect a majority of the members of the 
[state] House of Representatives." 377 U.S. at 545. 
30. See Note, supra note 26, at 1250: ''While all [three of] these measuring rods may 
be helpful, none is alone sufficient to determine the extent, and consequently the 
legitimacy, of a deviation from absolute equality." 
In Drew v. Scranton, 229 F. Supp. 310 (M.D. Pa. 1964), the court used a fourth 
method that is somewhat unusual; it ruled that counties could be used as the basis for 
representation so long as the population deviations did not differ from the statewide 
ratio by a major fraction (½ or larger). This meant that if the statewide ratio was 
10,000 people per representative, any deviation of 5,000 or more would be invalid. Such 
an approach, however, merely restricts the deviation from the norm to less than 50 
per cent. 
31. 377 U.S. at 578. 
32. 385 U.S. 440 (1967). 
33. 385 U.S. at 442. 
34. 385 U.S. 455 (1967). 
35. Grills v. Branigan, 255 F. Supp. 155, 158 (S.D. Ind. 1966). 
36. 386 U.S. 120 (1967). 
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divisions as voting districts. The Massachusetts figures, being several 
times larger than those in the cases noted, do not seem to permit 
a finding that the reapportionment plan involved only a minor devia-
tion from the equal-population principle. Even disregarding the 
effect of the allocation of two seats to the counties in the principal 
case, the Massachusetts plan presents, in Hampshire County, a vari-
ance ratio of 1.31 to 1 and a deviation from the norm of 13.3 per 
cent-figures perilously close to those disapproved in the above cases. 
Assuming for the purposes of the ensuing discussion that the 
deviations in the principal case could be termed minor under any 
acceptable method of measurement, it is questionable whether the 
plan satisfies the second requirement of the Reynolds exception from 
the principle of population equality-that is, that the deviations 
must be "based on legitimate considerations incident to the effectua-
tion of a rational state policy."37 The tenor of the court's opinion 
was essentially the same as the reasoning rejected in Reynolds-the 
fear that people in one area of the state would not be adequately 
represented if their district was combined with another area of larger 
population. The Massachusetts court stated: "The executive and 
legislative departments of the Commonwealth manifestly believe 
that genuine representation of the islands would not survive should 
they be merged into a mainland district or districts. We share that 
belief .... "38 
The findings of the legislature which the court relied on in 
reaching this conclusion presented only the most general reasons for 
preserving individual representation for the island counties. The 
legislature stated that "[t]hese are islands, isolated, not readily acces-
sible and most difficult to merge with any portion of the main-
land .... "39 The court's assertion that the districting was proper 
was tied to the statements in Reynolds concerning permissible devia-
tions.40 The Massachusetts court's opinion stated that the islands 
constitute two compact, contiguous districts whose borders con-
form to natural boundaries and whose right to representation as 
entities in the General Court [the state legislature] antedates by 
nearly eighty years the meeting of the First Continental Congress. 
The districting of the islands follows existing political subdivision 
lines and aims to restrict the possibility of partisan gerrymandering 
and to give effect to the county role in the governmental system of 
the Commonwealth.41 
Aside from the fact that the Supreme Court's opinion in Reynolds 
imposed the requirement, discussed above, that deviations based 
'!,7. Reynolds v. Sims, '!,77 U.S. 5'!,3, 579 (1964). 
'!,8. Principal case at 289. 
'!,9. Ch. 877, § 1, [1967] Mass. Acts, amending MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 57 (1932). 
40. '!,77 U.S. at 577-81. 
41. Principal case at 289 (footnotes omitted). 
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upon such factors must be minor, the Massachusetts opinion is in-
sufficient because it speaks only in conclusory terms.42 It may be that 
the island counties in the principal case present a situation in which 
the deviations are legitimate; however, any such finding must be 
based on a more persuasive presentation of concrete reasons for 
abandoning the equal-population principle than that presented by 
the Massachusetts court. 
The arguments offered in support of separate representation for 
the two islands are strikingly similar to those offered in support of 
similar treatment for sparsely populated rural areas vis-a-vis large 
urban centers-the situation obtaining in most reapportionment 
cases. The Supreme Court has made it clear that arguments based 
upon the unique character, interests, and needs of rural areas are 
unconvincing when they are advanced to show the inadequacy of 
representation that would result if such areas were merged with 
urban areas in the same district. For example, in Lucas v. Forty-
Fourth General Assembly of Colorado the Court held that substan-
tially equal representation by population must obtain in both the 
rural and urban areas of Colorado, despite the strong dissent of 
Justice Clark, who argued: 
The state has mountainous areas which divide it into four 
regions, some parts of which are almost inpenetrable. There are also 
some depressed areas, diversified industry and varied climate, as 
well as enormous recreational regions and difficulties in transporta-
tion. These factors give rise to problems indigenous to Colo-
rado .... 43 
It is difficult to find any compelling reasons why islands present a 
better case for separate representation than do such diversified areas, 
and the Massachusetts court offers none. Looking, then, to what 
appears to be the court's rationale in the principal case-that equal 
representation would deny effective representation-it seems that 
the case for "legitimate considerations incident to the effectuation 
of a rational state policy" has not been made. 
It remains to consider whether such a general exemption from 
strict apportionment by population does or should exist. There is 
42. In the section of the Reynolds opinion relied upon by the Massachusetts court 
in the principal case, the Supreme Court emphasized that: 
Citizens, not history or economic interests, cast votes. Considerations of area alone 
provide an insufficient justification for deviations from the equal-population prin-
ciple. Again, people, not land or trees or pastures, vote. Modern developments and 
improvements in transportation and communications make rather hollow, in the 
mid-1960's, most claims that deviations from population-based representation can 
validly be based solely on geographical considerations. Arguments for allowing 
such deviations in order to insure effective representation for sparsely settled areas 
and to prevent legislative districts from becoming so large that the availability of 
access of citizens to their representatives is impaired are today, for the most part, 
unconvincing. 
377 U.S. at 580. 
43. 377 U.S. 713, 742 (1964). 
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nothing in the Constitution that either requires or permits the 
specific exceptions mentioned in Reynolds, and it is clear that the 
state must justify any population deviations among districts.44 More-
over, the later decisions indicate that such justification is quite 
difficult; in fact, the exceptions to the equal-population principle 
may be of decreasing significance. In Avery v. Midland County45 the 
Court extended the "one man-one vote" standard to units of local 
government. Although the Court's formulation of the standard46 
was basically similar to that of the earlier cases, the majority opinion 
phrased the issue broadly as "whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
likewise forbids the election of local government officials from dis-
tricts of disparate population."47 Commenting upon the resolution of 
this question in the affirmative, Justice Fortas' dissent stated that 
"[t]his holding, literally applied as the Court commands, completely 
ignores the complexities of local government in the United States-
complexities which, Reynolds itself states, demand latitude of pre-
scription."48 This interpretation of the Avery opinion is bolstered 
by the fact that the majority-unlike that in Reynolds-makes no 
mention of any permissible grounds for deviation from a standard 
of strict population equality in districting for units of local govern-
ment having general governmental powers. Moreover, the circum-
stances in which the Court granted certiorari in Avery were some-
what unusual. The Texas Supreme Court had already ruled that, 
under "the requirements of the Texas and the United States Con-
stitutions,"40 the plan was invalid; however, the state supreme court 
disagreed with the state trial court's conclusion that local govern-
mental units were required to have substantially equal populations 
and stated that such factors as the "number of qualified voters, land 
areas, geography, miles of country roads and taxable values"50 could 
be considered in drawing district lines. Arguably, there was an ade-
quate state ground for the state court's decision and it was clear that 
a new plan of apportionment would be drawn up.51 Assuming that 
this was the case, it appears that the Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari to prevent the Texas court's assertion that factors other than 
population could be considered in a new districting scheme from 
having any effect. Justice Fortas stated that the majority, 
44. Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 444 (1967). See also McKay, supra note 8, at 
232-33. 
45. 390 U.S. 474 (1968). 
46. 390 U.S. at 484-85. 
47. 390 U.S. at 479. 
48. 390 U.S. at 499 Gustice Fortas, dissenting). 
49. 406 S.W .2d 422, 425 (1966). 
50. 406 S.W.2d 428. 
51. There was disagreement between the majority and the dissenters in Avery as 
to whether the grant of certiorari was proper. Compare the majority position, 390 
U.S. at 478 n.2 with Justice Harlan's dissent, 390 U.S. at 486-87. 
596 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 67 
now plunges to adjudication of the case ... in midstream, apparently 
because it rejects any result that might emerge which deviates from 
the literal thrust of one man, one vote. Since it now adopts this 
simplistic approach, apparently the majority believe that they might 
as well say so and save Texas the labor of devising an answer.52 
Although Avery may not have been intended to eliminate the 
exception to the equal-population principle set forth in Reynolds, 
it is susceptible of that interpretation. Such a demand for absolutely 
strict population equality would be consistent with the concern ex-
pressed by the Court in another area involving voting rights. In 
cases involving access to the polls, the Court has consistently held 
tliat intentional deviations from equal protection are invalid, re-
gardless of state policy in setting up the qualification upon the right 
to vote. In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections53 the Court struck 
down a state poll tax, holding: 
To introduce wealth or payment of a fee as a measure of a voter's 
qualifications is to introduce a capricious or irrelevant factor. The 
degree of discrimination is irrelevant . . . . [T]he requirement of 
fee paying causes an "invidious" discrimination ... that runs afoul 
of the Equal Protection Clause.54 
It would be consistent to argue in a situation such as the principal 
case that a mainland resident's vote is no less diluted by the appor-
tionment scheme because the state claims it has good reason to 
dilute it. Of course, such a contention depends upon the underlying 
premise that the franchise is so fundamental in a democratic 
society55 that dilution of the right to vote is as improper as denying 
it altogether. Since it is the right to vote that is at stake, perhaps the 
degree of dilution of some citizens' votes should be irrelevant and 
even minor deviations from strict population equality should be 
held impermissible. 
Thus, if review of the principal case is sought, it is highly un-
likely that the Supreme Court would approve the Massachusetts 
plan. The Court could base this result upon any of three rationales: 
(1) that the divergence from the equal-population standard is "sub-
stantial"; (2) that the deviations, even if minor, were not included 
in pursuance of a rational state policy but rather for reasons that 
the Court rejected in Reynolds; or, (3) that as a result of Avery and 
cases like Harper, the only variations permitted are those which 
52. 390 U.S. at 496 (dissent). 
53. 383 U.S. 663 (1966). 
54. 383 U.S. at 668. 
55. "The right to vote freely for the candidate of one's choice is the essence of a 
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of representa-
tive government." Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). See also Wesberry v. 
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380; Baker v. Carr, 369 
U.S. 186, 242 (1962) Gustice Douglas, concurring). 
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occur because of the impossibility of drawing legislative districts with 
exact mathematical precision. 
Since the first two rationales seem adequate, the Court might 
choose not to discuss the effect of Avery; basing such a decision on 
that case would involve an explicit departure from Reynolds. How-
ever, resting a reversal on a strict application of the equal-population 
principle would assure that Reynolds could not be circumvented by 
entrenched state legislators who maneuver to avoid districts of equal 
population. Such a decision would also greatly reduce the volume 
of litigation which has arisen and can continue to arise if the justifica-
tion for and the extent of deviations must be examined on a case-by-
case basis.116 The Court has had sufficient time to re-examine the effect 
of its initial decisions. It has not yet approved of a single deviation 
in any of the cases that have come before it, and this may indicate 
that its earlier formulation of the equal-population principle in 
Baker and Reynolds was a concession to strong political opposition 
and should now be abandoned in favor of one requiring strict equal-
ity of population in legislative districts. 
In Massachusetts, the first step in applying such a standard would 
be to divide the average population per legislative seat, 22,064, 
into the population of each county. This would give the following 
allocation: 
TABLE 2 
Number of Population Population per 
County Representatives in 1965 Representative 
Barnstable 3 73fJ57 24fJ19 
Berkshire 7 145fJ97 20,800 
Bristol 19 415,242 21,855 
Dukes 0 5,948 
Essex 27 608,996 22fJ56 
Franklin 3 57,687 19,229 
Hampden 20 435,281 21,764 
Hampshire 5 100,065 20,013 
Middlesex 58 1,280,235 22,073 
Nantucket 0 3,714 
Norfolk 25 560,137 22,405 
Plymouth 13 292,697 22fJ15 
Suffolk 32 706,216 22,069 
,vorcester 28 609,909 21,782 
Total 240 5,295,281 
Average 22,Q64 
This initial distribution would be invalid; Dukes and Nantucket 
Counties are unrepresented, Barnstable County is underrepresented, 
56. In his dissent in Avery, Justice Harlan stated that the present formulation of 
the "one man-one vote" standard has proved unsatisfactory because "[a] number of 
significant administrative questions remain unanswered [including the degree of per-
missible population variation], and the burden on the federal courts has been sub• 
stantial." ll90 U.S. at 489. 
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and Franklin County is overrepresented. Of course, there are many 
ways to resolve these problems; some would require redrawing dis-
trict lines and others would involve merging existing units. One 
possibility is that the two island counties be merged with Barn-
stable County and the new unit given four representatives. This 
would result in a county with a population per representative of 
approximately 20,805-a figure sufficiently close to the norm to be 
acceptable. Such a combination would be more beneficial in terms of 
representation of the islands' special interests than merging each one 
with a separate mainland county. It would give them combined 
strength in the new unit that would perhaps be more significant 
quantitatively than if they were each merged into larger counties. 
Moreover, the qualitative aspect of the islands' representation could 
be improved since a merger with Barnstable County-which includes 
Cape Cod-would group them with another coastal area with 
similar interests in terms of public works, conservation, and the 
promotion of tourism. To maintain a lower house with 240 seats, 
Franklin County might have to yield one seat and be redrawn to 
include only 44,000 residents. The remaining areas from the former 
Franklin County would then have to be added to contiguous counties 
that are overrepresented to a slight degree. Such a process would 
bring the districting close to mathematical precision, minimizing 
both underrepresentation and overrepresentation. 
